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The notion of habit is pervasive in William James’s entire intellectual 
biography, and plays a central role in his writings on psychology as well as in 
his ethical-political essays. While commentators have noticed this widespread 
presence, still scarce attention has been given to a generative tension internal to 
the very notion of Jamesian habit: if habit, as pictured in The Principles of 
Psychology and corollary psychological writings, is what carries us through the 
day and makes the accomplishment of the various activities in which we engage 
possible in the first place, in the moral and political domain habit might 
represent a serious impediment for one’s personal and social flourishing because 
of its tendency to dry the very sources of our ethical wells. 
I this paper I aim at exploring this tension by showing how, rather than a 
gross inconsistency, this double soul of habit (habit as advantage and habit as 
hindrance) represents the core of James’s ethical project of putting self-
experimentation back at the center of our reflective lives. If in fact the 
cultivation of habit is the key, vital activity through which we constitute 
ourselves as purposeful and effective subjects, their crystallization and stiffening 
results in the very mortification and deadening of the self, and especially of its 
moral and political ambitions. Through the education of habit we spin our 
characters and chances, and yet James invites us to keep this very effort alive in 
an ongoing exercise of self-criticism as once a certain habit is taken for granted 
we dissipate our energies and jeopardize our potentialities altogether. 
Thus, according to James, not habits simpliciter, but rather unfamiliar 
habits, should lie at the very center of our psychological and practical life: that 
is, those habits unsettling us but still characterizing us, habits which we are 
always on the verge of loosing grasp of despite inspiring our conducts and 
defining our biographies. This understanding of habit lies at the center of 
James’s distinctive ethical vision of human beings as progressive and perfectible 
beings engaged in an unbroken and unfinished transformative work of the self 
on itself. This I take to be the underlying lesson informing James’s earlier 
writings on psychology and his later ones on moral and political conduct alike. 
 
 
HORTATORY ETHICS AND THE CULTIVATION OF THE SELF 
 
The reading of James’s conception of habit here defended is part of a 
wider, radical interpretation of his moral thought (and of his work as a moral 
philosopher)1. As against the mainstream reading according to which in his 
writings James would have advanced a prescriptive moral theory (of which 
various accounts have been offered), I claim how it is possible to locate in his 
writings a pragmatic version of the classical2 conception of self-cultivation and 
self-experimentation as the proper subject-matter and goal of ethics. Such 
heterodox project and line of inquiry is opposed to the orthodoxy of rule-based 
and action-guiding morality systems currently dominating the philosophical 
scene. 
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Two sets of texts can be brought as evidence of this revisionist 
reconstruction:3 the earlier psychological ones (The Principles of Psychology, 
Psychology: Briefer Course) and the later ethical-political ones (The Will to 
Believe, Essays in Religion and Morality). In his writings on psychology James 
elaborates a picture of the edification and care of the self as an activity of ethical 
significance: the moral life is described by James as a field for self-fashioning in 
which we challenge our styles of reasoning and ways of reactions, while moral 
investigation is understood as a critical inquiry into the postures and stances that 
we might take toward ourselves and the world. By painting a rich 
phenomenology of the various ways in which we might (and might not) take 
care of the various aspects of our life of the mind, James displays those 
techniques of the self that we can use, or misuse, in order to constitute as 
individual selves, and which for this precise reason are activities of moral 
relevance.  
In his ethical-political writings James focuses instead on the most practical 
dynamics and outcomes of the unleashing of our moral energies in conduct. 
Heroism and individualism are depicted as chief ethical practices in which we 
have a chance to express our subjectivity in always-novel directions, thus 
resisting the widespread de-moralization caused by conformism and 
conservatorism. In these texts what is at stake is a conceptual reconsideration of 
our reflective experiencing as an activity of moral significance in which we 
shape and take care of our selfhood in an unbroken re-negotiation of our 
biographies and of their boundaries. 
In both these psychological and ethical-political writings the notion of 
habit seems thus to be playing a central role. Yet, at a first sight that of habit 
does not seem to be a very promising notion to work with when practicing ethics 
in a Jamesian mood. Habit (and habitual responses and thought) would in fact 
figure by its own definition as an impediment for moral self-realization 
understood in terms of creative self-fashioning. James himself seems very 
suspicious and critical of habit and customs because of their conservative inertia. 
There are plenty of evidences for this concern. In “The Energies of Men” James 
notices for example how 
 
[m]ost of us feel as if we lived habitually with a sort of cloud 
weighing on us, below our highest notch of clearness in discernment, 
sureness in reasoning, or firmness in deciding. Compared with what 
we ought to be, we are only half awake. Our fires are damped, our 
drafts are checked. We are making use of only a small part of our 
possible mental and physical resources.4 
 
James sensibly argues that such condition is at least partially due to the 
inhibition of excitements, ideals and efforts, which are precisely what according 
to James “carry us over the dam” of our ordinary existences. The distress caused 
by such condition originates in suffocating conventions and habits grew too stiff 
around our subjectivity, thus alienating and disciplining us to lead lives of quiet 
desperation. 
As against this picture, James praises novelty and improvisation as morally 
refreshing attitudes, praising heroic figures for their capacity to break the spell 
of custom thus opening up new fields of possibility and meaning. It is in fact 
those exceptional individuals who, by forcing the barriers grew around their 
subjectivity with “physical work, intellectual work, moral work, or spiritual 
work” serve as exemplars to imitate and as provocations challenging our deepest 
personal convictions. We all have been there.5 In “The Importance of 
Individuals” James states that 
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[t]here is thus a zone of insecurity in human affairs in which all 
the dramatic interest lies; the rest belongs to the dead machinery 
of the stage. This is the formative zone, the part not yet ingrained 
into the race’s average, not yet a typical, hereditary, and constant 
factor of the social community in which it occurs.6 
 
For James such generative moments are of the utmost importance as by shaking 
us from our certainties they help us to plunge again into experiencing and create 
importance in our life and in that of the community we partake to –not to 
mention the crucial possibility of opening up novel paths of dialogue with alien 
outlooks and politics. According to James we should always be willing to re-
negotiate the truths we live by in order to keep their meaning alive, our mindset 
plastic, and our selfhood mobile. This willingness to live courageously in the 
absence of certitudes and assurance is for James the signature mark of the 
pragmatic temperament, which he encourages us to explore in conduct.7 
At the same time James reportedly praises habit for its usefulness in 
facilitating our worldly dealings as well as for its importance in securing our 
own narrative sense of identity necessary for their flourishing. According to 
James the very notion of rationality as cashed out in our everyday practices 
would be nothing but a mustering of settled habits whose reputation we trust and 
honor.8 Having given up any non-conversational, external foundation for our 
practices of knowledge and action alike, the only pragmatic viable alternative 
seems to be exactly that of indulging in conventions and simmering in customs. 
Habits are thus not only practically important for the successfulness of our 
ordinary commerce with the world, but the acknowledgment of their pervasive 
character is also philosophically crucial to contrast those metaphysical accounts 
of norms and normativity pretending to explain the rightness (and rightfulness) 
of our practices from outside of their habitual exercise. 
A quick survey of the texts would thus suggest how for James habit is both 
the key to unleash our moral energies in conduct, and their foremost threat and 
source of alienation. In what follows I shall argue that, rather than at an 
inconsistency, this active tension best exemplifies James’s conception of the 
experimental work of the self on the self as the chief ethical-political activity. In 
particular, an attentive reading of the peculiar characterization of habit in The 
Principles of Psychology and corollary works would allow us to appreciate how 
James endows habit the philosophical resources to make it the centerpiece of his 
ethical-political thought. Before selectively comment James’s discussion of 
habit as it appears in his psychological writings, I shall briefly offer some 
context for reading The Principles of Psychology as a resourceful work for and 
in ethics. This is in fact a necessary passage to appreciate the richness and 
productive character of habit as James understood it and put it to work in his 
later writings as well. 
 
 
THE MORAL LIFE OF THE MIND 
 
The presence of moral considerations in The Principles of Psychology has 
been variously documented, and yet it is difficult to characterize in detail. There 
have been offered diverse reconstructions of such presence, and while only in 
some cases such considerations have been thematized in the wider context of 
James’s variegated moral production, very seldom they have been inscribed in 
the wider discourse of the hortatory character of ethics, which I take to be the 
central dimension of James’s moral thought.9 According to the reading I 
advocate, rather than presenting the single constitutive elements of the moral 
UNFAMILIAR HABITS                                            105 
	
William James Studies: Vol. 11 
	
life10, in The Principles of Psychology James would have rather explored the 
reflective work on them necessary for its flourishing.11 This feature makes the 
text a gold mine for ethics understood as the critical inquiry into our postures 
and conducts from the point of view of the transformative work on the self 
necessary for their cultivation and guidance. 
Despite its well-known self-proclaimed positivistic intents, according to 
which he “[has] kept close to the point of view of natural science throughout the 
book”, The Principles of Psychology represents James’s most elaborate attempt 
to waive together an impressive number of psychological, philosophical and 
personal “descriptive details” about what could be broadly characterized as our 
life of the mind. In it we can find the seeds as well as some of the most elegant 
deployments of that pragmatic method that James kept elaborating and polishing 
in the course of his entire intellectual biography, in which critical descriptions, 
tactical provocations, and original insights are blended together to fashion a 
unique prose and style.12 In The Principles of Psychology James looks at the 
various aspects and functions of our life of the mind from the point of view of 
their use, and exhorts us to notice the variety of moral considerations at play 
when we look at them in this way. James in fact claims that the analysis of our 
mindedness and its various traits would be conducted from the point of view of 
their activity, because a good description of our interiority as a bundle of 
functions and forces could not but consider its practical exercise as its proper 
dimension and achievement. 
James individuates in this way the contribution of psychology to ethics in 
its characterization of the dynamic nature of the relationship that human beings 
might entertain with their own subjectivity: the pragmatic illustrations of the 
various aspects and functions of our life of the mind disseminated in The 
Principles of Psychology would show the moral importance of the engaged 
attitude we might entertain with ourselves. This way of presenting psychology 
as an inquiry directly relevant for ethics brings to light a picture of moral 
reflection whose object is what human beings might make of those features of 
their own interiority that bring them in a certain relationship with themselves 
and the world. 
 By giving up a detached, third-personal description of the various facets of 
our selfhood in favor of an engaged, first-personal one, James makes room for a 
different picture of the way in which psychological considerations might be 
relevant for ethics. In fact, from this perspective the various threads of our 
subjectivity are presented from the point of view of their use rather than as 
neutral and ready-made data on which an ethical theory should build a 
prescriptive morality system. Rather than one of foundation, the relationship 
between ethics and psychology would thus be for James one of emergence. 
Instead of conceiving morality as kept pure from any human involvements or 
shaping it after a metaphysical picture of human beings and their worldliness, a 
pragmatist approach to moral reflection envisions a radical alternative. James 
invites us to think ethical reflection as informed by a peculiar kind of pragmatic 
anthropological description portraying human beings neither as they are nor as 
they should be, but rather from the point of view of what they might make of 
themselves.13 
In this perspective ethics acquires the form of the analysis of these forms 
and techniques of self-cultivation: moral reflection, by inviting us to refine and 
take care of the various dimensions of our subjectivity, reconfigures itself as the 
critical survey of the kind of self-experimentations we can undertake in ordinary 
conducts through a work of the self on the self. This process involves a 
revolution of the self in which we awaken those aspects of our subjectivity from 
the torpid state in which they tend to fall when not exercised through a daily 
training, and use them to face experience and its challenges in original, 
rewarding, and enriching ways. 
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HABIT BETWEEN EXPRESSION AND EXHAUSTION 
 
The discussion of habit in the fourth chapter of The Principles of 
Psychology can be read as a chief instance of such pragmatic anthropology.14 
James presents habit as one of the most powerful law and pervasive 
phenomenon of our mindedness and worldliness: without it our lives could 
hardly be lived, and yet its excesses might be equally lethal for their flourishing, 
since they would suffocate their constitutive and most important venues of 
expression and growth. In particular, an excess of habit, says James, would 
hinder and alienate us from ourselves, thus depriving us from those very 
energies and resources constituting the best part of our selfhood: the higher or 
further self we might have been or become if only we would have dared to think 
and conduct ourselves differently from how we habitually do.15 
James presents in the first place what he calls the physiological bases of 
habit, writing that “the phenomena of habit in living beings are due to the 
plasticity of the organic materials of which their bodies are composed”16. Habit 
in fact refers to the capacity for movement of our central nervous system. 
However, even at this basic physical level of analysis, James refutes a 
mechanistic characterization of the very nature and working of habit. He in fact 
subscribes the anti-reductionist perspective of the reflex arch and of the electro-
chemical discharge, which portray habit as the fixation of the nervous discharge 
trajectories in our nervous system in perennial tension. At this level of 
explanation habit is still described as a somewhat passive device, since it merely 
indicates those privileged paths of inertia. However, this passivity is in its turn 
characterized as a condition for activity, since it suggests and facilitates the 
nervous discharge (and thus, at the practical level, the performance of actions). 
Further, and most importantly, for James “our nervous system grows to the 
modes in which it has been exercised”17: once such paths of inertia and 
discharge are chosen and reinforced in conduct they grow thicker and acquire 
strength and influence, thus shaping our very dispositions and reactions. 
James is particularly interested in presenting two psychological features of 
habits that would have great relevance from the point of view of their 
philosophical description and ethical consequences. He writes, 
 
The first result of it is that habit simplifies the movements required to 
achieve a given result, makes theme more accurate and diminishes 
the fatigue.18  
 
The next result is that habit diminishes the conscious attention with 
which our acts are performed.19 
 
For James, thus, a subject endowed with the appropriate habits is likely to be 
more accurate in the achievement of its ends, and its conscious attention less 
solicited in the exercise of her actions. These two features of habit are of the 
utmost importance from an ethical point of view. In fact, if on the one hand 
habits make us more accurate and effective, on the other their blind and 
uncritical deployment have the opposite effect of render us inattentive and 
passive. If thus for James it is essential to nurture one’s habits, even more is to 
challenge them by asking oneself which habits to cultivate, and especially how 
to cultivate them. 
James presents habits as our “second nature”, since they craft human beings 
in every aspect of their mental life hence their thoughts and deeds. Rather than 
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the mechanical repetition of our responses through the comparison and 
association with our past experiences, James depicts habit as the distinctive 
feature of our active attitude toward our interiority and engaged stance toward 
reality. Habit becomes thus the chief device to storage, organize and control our 
mental energy releasing in this way our conscious attention, which is 
continuously solicited by the great amount of information involved in our 
experiencing. Once we internalize some aspects of reality to which we pay 
selective attention, our consciousness of them and the effort to entertain them in 
our mind is alleviate, so that we are free to concentrate on other aspects of 
reality that are of interest for us. 
For James our very ability to have meaningful experiences and invest them 
with value as contrasted with registering their sheer factual happening (that is, 
the breaking of the order of immediate perceptive presence presenting us the 
world as an indistinct complexity in order to generate meaning) requires us to 
develop all kinds of habits. In the essay “Reflex Action and Theism” James 
writes, 
 
We have to break [the perceptual order] altogether, and by picking 
out from it the items that concerns us…we are able to…enjoy 
simplicity and harmony in the place of what was chaos…It is an 
order with which we have nothing to do but to get away from it as 
fast as possible. As I said, we break it: we break it into histories, 
and we break it into the arts, and we break it into sciences; and 
than we begin to feel at home.20 
 
Through our inclusion and omission we trace the path of habit and thus of our 
experiencing and agency altogether. The aim of habit is to make us “feel at 
home” in the world by breaking our experiences and connecting the elements 
that interest us with other that we find as much appropriate and worth 
entertaining in our lives. Habit thus contributes to our very activity of making 
sense of the world and of our place in it: through habit we craft the world giving 
it a human shape in which to inscribe our conducts and their deepest 
significances. 
The ethical stakes of such a characterization are of the outmost importance. 
James claims in fact that habit is the “engine of society” and its “precious 
preserver”. However, James adds, the primary object of habit is the character of 
human beings, representing its “invisible law” in the similar manner as the 
“universal gravitation” represents the law of celestial bodies. Habit has to do 
with the education of one’s character as it represents the mark of one’s personal 
point of view that we shape through a discipline of the self. Habits are thus 
morally relevant because they pervade our lives and guide our encounters with 
the world, thus making the latter a place hospitable for the expression of our 
interiority in conduct. In the chapter on “The Laws of Habit” of Talks to 
Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideas James writes 
that 
 
[o]ur virtues are habits as much as our vices. All our life, so far as it 
has definite form, is but a mass of habits,—practical, emotional, and 
intellectual,—systematically organized for our weal or woe, and 
bearing us irresistibly toward our destiny, whatever the latter may 
be.21 
 
A similar formulation can be found in The Principles of Psychology, where 
James concludes that 
 
[t]he great thing, then, in all education, is to make our nervous system 
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our ally instead of our enemy. It is to fund and capitalize our 
acquisitions, and live at ease upon the interest of the fund. For this we 
must make automatic and habitual, as early as possible, as many 
useful actions as we can, and guard against the growing into ways 
that are likely to be disadvantageous to us, as we should guard against 
the plague.22  
 
For James habits should be our closest allies, and yet we should also remain 
vigilant in their handling as they could revel to be our worse enemies. According 
to this view, in fact, habits are not virtuous or evil per se, but rather it is what we 
make of them and how do we nurture them that makes them advantageous or 
rather harmful, and thus relevant from a moral point of view. If from the one 
hand habits give voice to our deepest needs, cravings and interests, on the other 
hand their misuse might cause the very suppression of our subjectivity.  
James lists five practical maxims involving the exercise of habit, in which 
what is at stake is our very attitude we might assume in their respect. These 
maxims have a clear and pronounced moral salience in their dealing with the 
ways in which our habits might be expressive of our subjectivity or rather 
contribute to its capitulation. The last maxim best catches the spirit of the 
exhortative moral register informing James’s dialectics of habits (and wider 
moral agenda). He writes, 
 
As a final practical maxim, relative to these habits of the will, we 
may, then, offer something like this: Keep the faculty of effort alive in 
you by a little gratuitous exercise every day. That is, be 
systematically ascetic or heroic in little unnecessary points, do every 
day or two something for no other reason than that you would rather 
not do it, so that when the hour of dire need draws nigh, it may find 
you not unnerved and untrained to stand the test…So with the man 
who has daily inured himself to habits of concentrated attention, 
energetic volition, and self-denial in unnecessary things. He will 
stand like a tower when everything rocks around him, and when his 
softer fellow-mortals are winnowed like chaff in the blast.23 
 
This practical maxim thematizes the dynamic relationship that runs between the 
habits we live by and the life we might have with them. James is here interested 
in marking an internal connection between ethics and psychology by showing 
how our posture toward those habits that we welcome or rather challenge is the 
mark of our moral destiny, thus depicting human beings as the makers of 
themselves and responsible for their own faiths. The price we have to pay for the 
metaphysical comfort of habit, representing the shield we use in order to be 
successful in our dealings with the world, is the constant thread of an 
impoverishment of such commerce. That is to say, the price to be thriving 
inhabitants of the world is that of being desolate strangers to ourselves. Only by 
acknowledging the habits we live by as our habits we might keep in place their 
significance without either subjugating our subjectivity or making knowledge an 
impossible task to accomplish. 
Quoting Mill’s definition of character as a “completed fashioned will” James 
stresses the relationship between the sensation of effort/activity necessary to 
manage a certain habit and its moral character: by representing a habit as a yoke 
imposed from the outside, as for example from evidences and associations on 
which we have no intentional grip nor active control, we distort both the way in 
which we arrive at forming an habit in the first place as well as jeopardize its 
very significance. We develop habits in response to our more genuine practical 
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need so to cope in more effective ways with the world; however, when we 
represent habit as a given with which to deal, we shall find ourselves incapable 
to satisfy those very practical needs which gave life to them in the first place. 
What was crafted to facilitate the successfulness of our practices suddenly 
becomes an impediment to the full flourishing of our interiority, a cage for its 
expression. James writes, 
 
The physiological study of mental conditions is thus the most 
powerful ally of hortatory ethics. The hell to be endured hereafter, of 
which theology tells, is no worse than the hell we make for ourselves 
in this world by habitually fashioning our characters in the wrong 
way. Could the young but realize how soon they will become mere 
walking bundles of habits, they would give more heed to their 
conduct while in the plastic state. We are spinning our own fates, 
good or evil, and never to be undone. Every smallest stroke of virtue 
or of vice leaves its never so little scar.24 
 
Moral reflection, in its hortatory dimension, aims at showing the practical 
advantages of the nurture and of the development of certain habits, and the 
dangerousness in which we incur when we alienate our subjectivity to their blind 
dictates. 
According to this characterization the subject matter of ethics would thus 
consist in a certain kind of work on the self, while its contents in the descriptions 
of the strategies that such formative activity might take. James claims that this 
work on the self involves in the first place the monitoring of, and the 
experimentation with, our habits and their ability to express our subjectivity or 
rather mortify it. James invites us to take a vigilant attitude on our habits so to 
prevent those “contractions of the self” typical of their deformation. Such 
critical activity of self-monitoring and self-transformation lies at the very heart 
of James’s ethical-political writings, where he launches a fierce campaign 
against various forms of acquiescence in our private and public lives. The latter 
has been James’s signature intellectual fight, and its roots are to be found in the 
notion of unfamiliar habit at the heart of his pragmatic anthropology. Such 
notion in fact pivotal to understand James’s investigation of the crucial issue of 
the possibility of conducting ourselves in ways which are at the same time 
expressive of our subjectivity and mindful and respectful of how our fellow 
individuals lead theirs. His writings on human blindness and on the moral 
equivalent of war can be read as variations on this theme, and his painstaking 
work to carve out a space of personal freedom within natural and social 
boundaries represents yet another example of his insistence on the cultivation 





The notion of habit is pervasive throughout James’s writings, informing his 
pluralism, transitionalism and perspectivism alike. Rather than confining the 
discussion and use of such concept to the psychological writings, James makes 
habit the centerpiece of our very agential nature as it gets expressed in its 
various activities of self-edification and world-making. There would in fact be 
an overall shift in philosophical emphasis from mere sensitivities to an enriched 
conception of agency underlying James’s characterization of habit. This idea 
gets articulated in various contexts throughout James’s work,26 but affects 
directly the way James understood the dynamic interplay between the urge to 
familiarity and the strive for estrangement, between the necessity of stability and 
the importance of uncertainty –a tension lying at the very heart of the moral life 
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as a pragmatist sees it. The work on the self is thus itself a moral task, where 
“moral” acquires the meaning of the critical concern, inquiry and transformation 
of conduct and activity from within one’s practices. 
Habit would impoverish our lives if understood as passively operating on 
our beliefs and desires, but by intertwining habit with agency and activity James 
shifted the focus from the acquisition and stabilization of habits to their 
education and practical experimentation. What is of primary moral importance 
for James is in fact our life with our habits: what we make of them and how we 
put them to work. In discussing habits James is not describing the working of an 
allegedly impersonal principle; rather, he is exhorting us to do something with 
ourselves in an imaginative exercise whose moral relevance lies in the liveliness 
and transformative character of its process rather than in its capacity to fulfill 
some prefixed aims.  
Contrary to other philosophical treatments of habit, for James the validity 
and evaluation of habitual conduct should not be measured against the yardstick 
of some already established norm or principle –whether brute or transcendental–
, but is rather to be re-negotiated in practice at every instance of its 
deployment.27 If there is a teleological dimension in this ethical picture, it is not 
imposed from the outside of our practices (because of some sort of finalism) but 
rather can only be gained from the within of our efforts (as an expression of 
genuine experimentalism). Unfamiliar habits are thus important because they 
force us to constantly question and unsettle ourselves, and thus cultivate and 
take care of ourselves in an ongoing negotiation of the boundaries and 
background of our selfhood. For James personal growth and collective 
flourishing are in fact dependent on habitual dishabituation, an exercise in 
possibility and melioristic attitude at the heart of our best ethical and political 
efforts of tuning the self with itself.28 
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1 Marchetti 2015. 
2 Virtue ethics, both in its ancient (Aristotelian) and modern (Humean) 
variations, being the obvious reference, the concern for the care of the self as the 
chief ethical task is also argued (although along slightly different lines) by the 
philosophical tradition of spiritual exercises (Hadot 1995, Foucault 2005), as 
well as by moral perfectionism (Cavell 2004). 
3 In my wider study of James’s moral thought I examine and assess the 
whole corpus of his writings, offering a synoptic view of his (work on) ethics 
and its grounding in a distinctive pragmatist metaphilosophical agenda, while 
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here I shall only touch on those works which are functional to address the topic 
of Jamesian habit. 
4 ERE, 131. 
5 It should be noticed how for James those of heroism and individualism 
are ethical practices (rather than metaphysical assumptions) constantly 
informing our most ordinary activities as long as we are concerned with the 
genuine character of our selfhood, challenging the identities supplied by those 
models we too-often unwittingly accept. The charges of elitism often raised 
against such perfectionist approaches –beside James, and limiting to the short 
time-span of one century, one might think of figures as different as John Stuart 
Mill, T. H. Green, Emerson, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein– should thus be at least 
substantially reconsidered (if not dropped altogether), as those very resources 
and materials for ethical transformation are constantly under our nose and thus 
up for us to grab rather than available only to the elites. If there surely are wider 
psychological, social, environmental, and cultural obstacles to such 
experimentations, they constitute the very background against which enacting 
such efforts in self-transformation: the former might well frustrate the factual 
outcomes of such practices of freedom, but in no way they can undermine their 
strategic value. Furthermore, for some versions of perfectionism such 
transformative exercises can only be enacted in conversation with others, and 
contribute to the overall well-being of one’s community –if only in making one 
more self-conscious of her own implicit assumptions, concealed expectations, 
and hidden regulations. 
6 WB, 192. 
7 See e.g. P: 31; MT: 124. 
8 See e.g. WB: 67. 
9 Even the most authoritative commentators (e.g. Royce 1891, Perry 1935, 
Myers 1981) only registered the most superficial and evident moral features of 
the text by making reference to those parts where the canonical moral language 
of duties, rights and commitments makes its day view, without however either 
characterizing in depth the dialectic in which such notions occur or noticing the 
multiple references to the other writings in which similar considerations surface 
as well. 
10 See e.g. Roth 1965; Franzese 2008. Contrary to the authors mentioned in 
the previous note, both Roth and Franzese have an articulated and interesting 
story about the moral dimension of The Principles of Psychology as well as of 
the wider picture of James’s ethical reflections as spelled out in his other 
writings –although a different story from the one here defended. 
11 The first account of The Principles of Psychology in which this practical 
register has been acknowledged is Seigfried 1978. For an articulated defense, 
see Koopman forthcoming. 
12 The best characterization of James’s distinctive methodological blend of 
“divination and perception” is Seigfried 1990 (esp. part II). 
13 I shall here pass over silence the Kantian resonances of this way of 
portraying the nature and point of a pragmatic anthropology so understood –at 
least, in the way Kant depicts pragmatic anthropology in his Anthropologie in 
pragmatischer Hinsicht [1798] as well as in his Königsberg lectures on 
anthropology [1772-1798], which is in tension with the “official” story narrated 
in his major Critical works. I have tackled the issue at some depth elsewhere 
(Marchetti, forthcoming). 
14 As an aside, one might say that for James habit is a sort of ethical 
Überkoncept, as according to this reconstruction it represents at once one of the 
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features of our interiority in need of reflexive working and the device through 
which all other facets would get transformed. I owe this observation to a 
conversation with Mathias Girel on an ancestor of this paper.  
15 An in-depth	comparative	study	of	the	Jamesian	and	the	Deweyan 
conceptions of habit is still lacking, and unfortunately so. Dewey (most notably 
in Dewey 1922) in fact borrowed, reworked, and expanded the Jamesian 
philosophy of habit along promising lines, adding some historical edge to 
James’s conceptual analyses and reconstruction. Differences between their 
respective accounts still mattering, I read in both authors a congenial insistence 
on the “good of activity” as the chief theme at the heart of the (pragmatist) 
ethical project. 
16 PP: 110. 
17 PP: 117. 
18 PP: 117. 
19 PP: 119. 
20 WB: 96.  
21 TT: 47. 
22 PP: 126. 
23 PP: 130. 
24 PP: 130-1. 
25 Following Koopman one might claim how James was interested in “the 
philosophical and political idea of a personal action which is reducible to neither 
individual power nor social relations” (Koopman 2005: 175). 
26 See e.g. PP: ch. xxvi; WB: 197-8; P: 98-9. For a comment, compare 
Parker 1999, Uffelman 2004, Koopman forthcoming. 
27 For a survey of James’s conception on similar lines, see Tursi 1999. A 
brief intellectual history of the rise and fall of philosophical accounts of habit in 
relation to James’s can be found in Thomas 1993. 
28 I am grateful to Lee A. Bride for having accepted the original paper for 
its presentation at the 2014 William James Society meeting held within the 111th 
APA Central Division annual convention in Chicago. I am also thankful to Tadd 
Ruetenik for his valuable comments during the conference, to appear in this 
symposium. I have here not attempted at replying to his critical remarks, hence 
change my paper accordingly, as that would have renderer their publication 
superfluous, but will take them into consideration in my future work on James’s 
ethics. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the Irish Research Council for a New 
Foundations Award (2013), which made my trip to Chicago possible. 
